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STATE OF UTAH 
REID D. BENCH and A L T A M . 
BENCH, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. / -
ERMA PACE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF 
FACTUAL AND ANALYTICAL MISCONCEPTIONS 
IN RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
Defense counsel has resorted to a protracted analysis 
of the testimony of Erma Pace with regard to her state 
of mind at and following the execution of the Lease-
Sales Agreement on September 8, 1965, and again on 
May 22,1967, when the Extension Agreement was signed, 
and claims that such testimony supports the trial court's 
finding that omission to reserve oil and gas rights in 
the agreement was the result of mutual mistake of fact. 
Defense counsel has also referred to testimony of defen-
dant's relatives and others regarding so-called oral ad-
Cace No. 
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missions of plaintiff to the effect that oil and gas rights 
were not to go with the land. 
As heretofore pointed out, this oral testimony was 
inadmissible. If its purpose was to vary the terms of the 
written instrument, it was violative of the parol evidence 
rule. If its purpose was to inject into the case an oral 
agreement to reserve oil and gas rights to defendant, it 
was violative of the Statute of Frauds. Fiirthermore, the 
testimony of Erma Pace is no stronger than the position 
she ultimately took on cross-examination. On cross-ex-
amination, she erased any contention she could ever 
make either that the document was ambiguous or that 
the reservation of oil and gas rights was omitted from 
the agreement and overlooked because of inadvertence. 
She testified by a voluntary statement as follows: 
"Q. (Mr. Black) You were aware very 
early in the proceedings of the failure to have 
the reservation of oil and gas rights in the docu-
ment, were you not? 
A. I was aware that it should have been 
in there before I ever signed it." 
Counsel now contends that the parities by using the 
word "farm" in the contract intended to reserve the sub-
surface rights. That argument must fail for three very 
basic reasons. First, Erma Pace on cross-examination 
conceded that she knew the reservation of oil and gas 
rights was not in the document, and also that it should 
have been in there. If the word "farm" had had the 
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connotation claimed for it by defense counsel, she would 
have had no such knowledge and no such concern. Sec-
ond, there is absolutely no other evidence that Mrs. P&ce 
misunderstood the Lease-Sales Agreement or that it was 
in any sense ambiguous. Third, it is fundamental and 
horn-book law that in a description, the specific governs 
the general. This agreement states: 
"The Owners have agreed to Lease and sub-
sequently sell to the buyers that certain one 
hundred twenty (120) acre irrigated farm lo-
cated approximately ten miles northwest of the 
city of Roosevelt * * * and more particu-
larly described as follows: (Italics ours.) (set-
ting forth legal description). 
The foregoing document constituted a conveyance of 
an interest in land as that term is defined in Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 57-1-1, which reads 
as follows: 
"The term 'conveyance' as used in this title 
shall be construed to embrace every instrument, 
in writing by which any real estate, or interest 
in real estate, is created, aliened, mortgaged, en-
cumbered or assigned, except wills, and leases for 
a term not exceeding one year. (Italics ours.) 
The extent of the interest created by the conveyance 
is likewise clear from a simple reference to Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 57-1-3, which reads 
as follows: 
"A fee simple title is presumed to be in-
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tended to pass by a conveyance of real estate, 
unless it appears from the conveyance that a 
lesser estate was intended." (Italics ours.) 
Counsel continues with the unsupportable contention 
that plaintiffs had failed to make rental payments on 
time under the Lease-Option Agreement, that plaintiffs 
had agreed to pay excess charges defendant may have 
incurred as a result of not having the money on time, 
and that this somehow may have affected the validity 
of plaintiff's later exercise of the option. This conten-
tion is nothing more nor less than smoke and haze. In 
the first place, defendant waived any possible right to 
claim default by accepting, banking and using the pay-
ments. In the second place, the record is devoid of any 
evidence that she in fact suffered any excess charges as 
a result of late payments. In the third place, after plain-
tiff's offer to pay any such excess charges, defendant ad-
mitted on cross-examination that she never did submit 
to plaintiff a list of so-called excess charges. Again we 
ask, how could plaintiff pay excess charges if he had no 
knowledge as to their amount? (R. 109, Exhibit 4). 
Counsel also makes much of Exhibit 12 executed on 
June 1, 1972, by plaintiff, and claims the document, exe-
cuted almost five months after the exercise of the option, 
was somehow an admission on plaintiff's part that he 
was making no claim to the oil and gas rights. 
It appears from the testimony that plaintiff had 
taken the document to Attorney George Mangan in com-
pany with a representative of Shell Oil Company before 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
signing same. It had already been prepared. The docu-
ment shows on its face that the word "surface" had been 
scratched out, and Mr. Bench had initialed the deletion. 
Mr. Mangan testified as follows: 
"The Court: The part scratched out was 
'surface'? 
A. That word there was surface. I recall 
that. This was the thing that gave Mr. Bench 
a great deal of difficulty. He did not wish to 
sign this document if it in any way was to re-
linquish any claim or right that he had to the 
minerals. And as I recall this conversation we 
assured Mr. Bench that we could not pass on 
the right that he had to minerals, but that it 
would simply agree that he was in possession of 
the surface, and that he had an option to pur-
chase, and that it put everyone on notice that 
he did have an option to purchase. As to what 
he would be actually entitled to receive was a 
matter that he would have to work out with Mrs. 
P&ce or a Court of law would have to interpret. 
As I recall that was the gist of our total conver-
sation" (R. 141, 142). (Italics ours.) 
We can't help wondering, in the face of Mr. Mangan's 
testimony, as supported by the document itself, why 
counsel continues to twist and distort this particular evi-
dence. Is his position really that weak? 
Counsel states at page 5 of his brief: 
"It was clear from the evidence as a whole 
that Mrs. Place did not know that plaintiffs 
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claimed oil, gas and mineral rights in the prop-
erty until she was served with a copy of the 
Complaint in this action (T. 196, 197). The 
Court so found (Finding of Fact No. 5) / ' 
This statement brings us back to the fundamental 
pitoposition that the Lease-Option Agreement was un-
ambiguous on its face and fully understood by both plain-
tiff and defendant. Therefore, what Mrs. Pace now 
claims to have either known or not known is really of 
no consequence. 
The attorneys for Mrs, Pace most certainly were 
aware of the content of the Lease-Option Agreement 
prior to the filing of the Oon^msmz They were the ones 
who came up, some two and a half months after the 
Option had been fully exercised, with an unnecessary 
and superfluous escrow agreement. And they were the 
ones who, for the very first time in the long history of 
this transaction, stuck in a reservation of oil and gas 
rights. Who says an escrow agreement was necessary? 
Defense counsel then concludes with the most in-
credible statement of all: 
"Plaintiffs never complied with the require-
ments of the option, and the lease eventully ex-
pired on September 15, 1973, approximately nine 
months after this lawsuit was filed." 
As for the mechanics of exercising the option, Mrs. 
Pace's testimony is the best evidence: 
"Q. Now a time came, did it not, Mrs. 
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Pace, when Mr. Bench presented himself at your 
home on or about January 8, 1971, and hand 
delivered to you a letter, and in addition to that 
hand delivered to you three checks, one a fifty 
dollar check, two a six hundred dollar check, 
and three a two thousand dollar check represent-
ing the down payment on the farm, isn't that 
correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. At that time did you read the letter 
which he had prepared and delivered to you? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you receive the three checks? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you deposit the three checks later 
on? 
A. I deposited the two thousand dollars, 
yes. 
Q. At that time did you ever request of 
Mr. Bench that an addendum or modification be 
entered on the original agreement to include a 
reservation of gas and oil rights to you? 
(dialogue of counsel) 
A. There was nothing until I had that es-
crow deal drawn up" (R. 106, 107). 
It can be seen from the foregoing that every single 
requirement of the Lease-Option Agreement was fully 
complied with on January 8, 1971 and that it wasn't until 
the attorneys, in April of 1971, sent Mr. Bench a pro-
posed Escrow Agreement that Bench, for the first time, 
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wias aware that Mrs. P&oe was attempting to attadh new 
conditions to an already executed option, one of which 
was the indusion of an oil and gas reservation. Again, 
we ask, how can a valid contention be made in this case 
that the option wasn't exercised in view of the foregoing 
uncontested testimony of Mrs. Pace? 
POINT I. 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IS MIS-
TAKEN IN HIS CONTENTION THAT THE 
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT PRE-
VENT REFORMATION OF THE LEASE-
OPTION AGREEMENT. 
Before considering some of the cases cited by de-
fense counsel in support of his parol evidence position, 
we point out that the trial court has never found that 
the Lease-Option Agreement was ambiguous. Rather, 
the court has found that: 
"the lease and option contract through mu-
tual mistake omitted the reservation of the min-
erals and foiled to conform to the intent of the 
parties at the time of the execntion of the in-
strument * * *•" 
And,, as we have pointed out, the interpretatibn 
counsel has attempted to impose on the tecrm, "irrigated 
farm" as creating an ambiguity is not supported by the 
evidence. 
Mrs. Pace has precluded herself from the claim of 
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ambiguity by testifying that before she executed the 
document she knew that there was no reservation of oil 
and gas rights and that such reservation should have 
been in the document. Furthermore, counsel for defen-
dant doesn't even claim that the reservation was left out 
of the agreement by inadvertence. Mrs. Pace testified 
that she had full knowledge as to the content and mean-
ing of the document. 
We take the position that E. A. Strout Western 
Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, Utah , 522 P. 
2d 144 (1974), is in point, and illustrates that the same 
trial judge continues to labor under the same misunder-
standing as to the true meaning of the parol evidence 
rule. We analyzed the Broderick case at page 12 of Ap-
pellants' Brief. But in connection with the Broderick 
case, we wish to again point out that in the case at bar 
the document was not ambiguous, nor was there any 
inadvertent omission overlooked by the parties. There-
fore, the parol evidence rule prevented admission of the 
testimony pointed out by counsel as being controlling. 
Typical of oases cited by counsel for defendant is 
that of Crabb v. Chisum, 183 Okl. 138, 80 P. 2d 653. A 
mere reference to the language of that case indicates the 
distinction. 
"the mistake in the notes in that case was 
due to an error on the part of the scrivener, 
which was not noticed by the plaintiff until long 
subsequent to the date of the execution of the 
notes." (Emphasis ours.) 
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There was certainly no error on the part of the scriv-
ener which remained unnoticed in the case at bar. 
Counsel attempts to fit this case into the framework 
of Intermountain Farmers Assn. v. Peart, 30 Utah 2d 
201, 515 P. 2d 614 (1973). The Peart case is clearly dis-
tinguishable. There the parties had agreed to a convey-
ance of two acres and the scrivener had mistakenly de-
scribed a five acre tract. The court, in supporting the 
trial court's decision allowing reformation of the deed, 
stated: 
"Through a mistake of its scrivener the war- ;• 
ranty deed executed by the plaintiff to the de-
fendants described the entire five acres. When 
the mistake was discovered, plaintiff requested 
the defendants to reconvey the excess acreage. 
The defendants refused to reconvey, and the 
plaintiff instituted these proceedings to reform 
the deed." 
The Peart case, supra, falls in the same category as 
the Crabb case, as a scrivener's error case. 
Counsel for defendant cites as supporting his posi-
tion Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P. 2d 620. 
We cited the Naisbitt case in Appellants' Brief. In the 
Naisbitt case we are again confronted with a scrivener's 
error. The original parties to a deed intended to include 
a 130 foot strip in a conveyance, but in describing the 
property in the deed they made a mutual mistake. The 
decision in the Naisbitt case is particularly interesting 
where the court discusses the quantum of proof and the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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foundational facts necessary to support a party's claim 
of mutual mistake. The Court stated: 
"Evidence necessary to substantiate the 
mutual mistake of fact must be clear, definite, 
and convincing, and the party seeking reforma-
tion should not be guilty of negligence in the 
execution of the contract or deed or laches in 
making timely application for its reformation." 
(Italics ours.) 
Erma P&ce was not mistaken as to the meaning of 
the Lease-Option Agreement. But one thing is clear. If 
she really intended to place a reservation of sub-surface 
rights in the agreement she was guilty of laches of the 
worst kind. She had many opportunities to reform the 
agreement. 
(1) She could have amended the agreement by 
interlineation at the time she signed it at her home 
among her relatives on September 8, 1965. 
(2) She could have amended the agreement at the 
time she signed the Lease Extension Agreement on May 
22, 1967. 
(3) She could have amended the agreement as a 
condition to receipt of the $2,000.00 when the option was 
exercised at her home on January 8, 1971. 
Instead, she waited down through the years until 
April of 1971 before making any attempt whatsoever 
to reform the agreement. On that date her lawyer at-
tempted to insert an oil and gas reservation in an un-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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necessary escrow agreement and threatened to repudi-
ate the option exercise unless the document was signed 
by plaintiff. 
Naisbitt is in point. It supports plaintiffs' position 
on the parol evidence rule. It also supports plaintiffs' 
position that defendant, as a matter of law, has failed 
utterly to lift her evidence to the necessary level in order 
to establish dearly and convincingly that a mutual mis-
take occured and that she was not guilty of laches in 
correcting the mistake. 
In this connection we call attention to the case of 
George v. Fritsch Loan & Trust Co., 69 Utah 460, 256 P. 
400 (1927). In the George case, suit was brought to 
enforce specific performance of a written contract for 
the sale of real estate. Defendant answered, admitting 
that it had executed the written contract and that it was 
obligated to convey to plaintiff the land described, but 
alleging that the contract did not reflect the intention 
of the parties in that by mutual mistake of the parties, 
there was omitted from the written contract various pro-
visions to the effect that there was not to be constructed 
upon the premises any building except a residence or 
apartment house or certain other types of business es-
tablishments. Defendant asked for reformation of the 
contract to include these provisions. The trial court 
allowed evidence of the oral understandings and granted 
the reformation. On appeal the case was reversed. The 
court stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"The general rule is that relief in the way 
of reform of a written instrument should not be 
granted when the party seeking it has acquiesced 
in the written agreement after being aware of 
the mistake. 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 981, and cases 
therein cited; 34 Cyc. 942, and cases cited in 
footnote." (Italics ours.) 
Counsel has made reference to the term "justice" 
at page 26 of his brief as though defendant and her 
counsel had a corner on the justice market. We cannot 
refrain from calling attention to the fact that at two 
places in his brief, counsel refers to defendant's status 
as a widow. There are many widows in this world. Wid-
ows, just as architects,, plumbers and college professors 
are bound by their bargains and must comply with the 
law. We are more than confident — we are certain the 
economic or marital status of the defendant or of the 
plaintiffs will receive no consideration when the court 
determines the issues of this case. 
POINT II. 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IS MIS-
TAKEN IN HIS CONTENTION THAT THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS E E E C m B g £ = 4 ^ - ^ ^ ^ 
gCL(/Pg P E N D A N T FROM ENFORCING ANY ORAL 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
REGARDING GIVING DEFENDANT OIL 
AND GAS RIGHTS ON THE PROPERTY. 
Counsel for defendant apparently misunderstands 
our position where he attempts to impose upon counsel 
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a contention that the Statute of Frauds prevents refor-
mation of a written document. That is not our conten-
tion at all. What we say is that if defense counsel has 
failed to establish a mutual mistake of fact, he is left 
with only one remaining position. That would be that 
the parties orally agreed that plaintiff at some future 
date would give defendant the oil and mineral rights 
to the property. Oil and mineral rights are a part of 
the realty and an oral agreement to make a future con-
veyance of them would clearly violate the Sitatute of 
Frauds and would be unenforceable. The case of Papa-
nickolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 272 P&c. 856 (1929), 
supports our position as do the other cases we have 
cited. 
Counsel for defendant states that plaintiffs' argu-
ment regarding fraud is a straw-man argument. (See 
page 27 of Respondent's Brief.) It is our position that 
the whole issue of fraud is a straw-man issue. But, it 
is defendant's straw-man issue, not ours. Defendant is 
the one who alleged and failed to prove fraud. 
POINT III. 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IS MIS-
TAKEN IN HIS CONTENTION THAT THE 
OPTION WAS NOT PROPERLY EXER-
CISED AND THAT PLAINTIFFS ACQUI-
ESCED IN ITS WITHDRAWAL. 
Plaintiff has set forth his position concerning exer-
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eise of the option and lack of acquiescence in its with-
drawal under Point VII of Appellants' Brief. Never-
theless, ceirtain statements in the Brief of Respondent 
would appear to require an answer. 
For example, counsel states at page 29: 
"At that time, Mr. Bench presented a check 
to Mrs. Pace in the amount of $2,000.00, but 
Mr. Bench did not tender payment of the late 
charges, nor did he tender any probated pay-
ment of the $600.00 annual farm lease rental (T. 
84)." 
The incredible contention that the option exercise 
was somehow lacking because no tender of any pro-rated 
payment of the $600.00 annual farm lease rental was 
made is simply not valid. No witness, including Mrs. 
P^ce, ever made such a statement. The return of the 
$2,000.00 and the repudiation of the option exercise by 
Mrs. Pace's lawyer was certainly not bottomed on such 
a contention. 
Counsel then states at page 29: 
"The parties agreed to enter into a new 
agreement which would provide for the sale of 
the subject property." 
The parties agreed to no such thing! 
To put this issue in proper context, the starting 
point goes back to January 8, 1971, when plaintiff exer-
cised the option by delivering to defendant the $2,000.00 
check, the $600.00 and the $50.00 check. No conditions 
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were attached to these payments. No additional re-
quirements were exacted by Mrs. Pace. Then, almost 
three months later, on April 5, 1971, counsel for defen-
dant wrote a letter to the plaintiff which, to say the 
least, is forceful in nature. 
It reads, in part, as follows: 
"Also pursuant to the Escrow Agreement, 
which Mr. Sam prepared, and which you have a 
copy of, would have to be executed, or, you will 
merely continue on with the lease until the same 
expires by its terms, which would be Septem-
ber 15, of 1973." 
The letter goes on to state: 
"If you want to exercise the option to pur-
chase the property, then it will be necessary that 
you either sign the Escrow Agreement and place 
the same at the bank, together with a deed from 
Mrs. Pace to be delivered upon the payment of 
the contract amount in full, or it will be con-
strued that you have not in fact bought the 
property." (Italics ours.) 
As the court will recall, the proposed escrow agree-
ment, contrary to the terms of the original agreement, 
contained a reservation of oil and gas rights. Mr. Bench, 
without benefit of legal counsel, responded to the Beaslin 
letter and stated, in part: 
"J agreed to lease the property with an op-
tion to purchase and the terms of said purchase 
were agreed upon by both Owners and Lessee. I 
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have not signed the papers prepared by Mr. Sam 
because these terms are being changed" See Ex-
hibit 8. (Italics ours.) 
The next thing that happened was that on June 2, 
1971, Mrs. Pfetce sent a letter to plaintiff returning the 
$2,000.00. Counsel for defendant claims that the fact 
plaintiff accepted the $2,000.00 proves that plaintiff ac-
quiesced in withdrawal of the option exercise. But, 
what did plaintiff say in his responsive letter of June 
15, 1971? (Exhibit 10). 
"It is only our desire and intention to purchase 
the farm as per our original Lease-Purchase 
agreement and the terms there outlined. Let's 
get together and iron out the difference." (Ital-
ics ours.) 
We submit the evidence clearly shows that Plaintiff 
was never willing to accept the refunded money and 
abandon his rights under the contract. He was merely 
attempting as best he could to compromise a difficulty 
he had come to realize existed between the parties to 
the agreement. His attempts resulted in failure. 
We also point out that at the time the lawsuit was 
filed, plaintiff was still within the time for exercising 
his option. The case was filed on November 30, 1972, 
and the option period would not expire until September 
8, 1973, 
The prayer of the Complaint asked for specific per-
formance of the contract and declaratory relief stating 
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the respective rights of the parties at and prior to the 
date of the filing. In other words, plaintiff was asking 
for the court to declare that he had properly performed 
the requisites of the option or for the right to do so per 
the original agreement of the parties of September 8, 
1965. The running of the option period subsequent to 
the filing of this action can have no bearing on the re-
spective rights of the parties as they existed on Novem-
ber 30, 1972 and prior thereto. 
In addition, we take the position that defendant so 
conducted herself at and after the $2,000.00 had been 
returned and during the time that the option would still 
have been in effect that a formal retendering of the $2,-
000.00 would have been a useless act and as a matter of 
law is not a prerequisite to plaintiffs' case. 
We cite Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edition, Volume 
15, page 447, as follows: 
"Sec. 1819. Waiver of Objection to Tender. Un-
der general principles, previously discussed, ten-
der is excused by obstruction or prevention or 
imposition of unwarranted conditions by the 
person to Whom it was to be made. So where 
the obligee has manifested to the obligor that 
tender, if made, will not be accepted, the obligor 
is excused from making tender as it would be <£ *£ 
most merely a futile gesture." 
POINT IV. 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IS MIS-
TAKEN IN HIS CONTENTION THAT THE 
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT AP-
PLICABLE TO THE AFFIRMATIVE DE-
FENSE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT. 
Counsel for defendant cites Stewart Livestock Com-
pany v. Potter, 105 U. 529, 144 P. 2d 276 (1943). 
This was a vendor's action against a mortgagor, live-
stock company, and a bank to foreclose a purchase-money 
mortgage. An answer pleaded a partial failure of con-
sideration to which the plaintiff replied with a claim 
that the Staitute of limitations had run. The Statute 
of Limitations defense was not allowed for the reason 
that the answer did not ask for affirmative relief. The 
court stated: 
"The third proposition urged by appellant, 
offset or recovery on the cross-demands of de-
fendants was barred by the Statute of Limita-
tions applicable to actions on written instru-
ments,, must likewise fail. Defendants did not 
seek any judgment other than the defeat of 
plaintiffs claims. Though a claim may be barred 
by the Statute of Limitations insofar as the 
right to recover a judgment is concerned, such 
claim may be set off against an adversary's 
claim. (Citing cases,)" (Italics ours.) 
There can be no doubt that defendant is asking for 
affirmative relief in the form of reformation. (See Re-
spondent's Brief at page 9.) The Statute of Limitations 
is, therefore, applicable to the case at bar. 
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The Utah case which we think is of significance is 
Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884 (1956). 
This was an action to quiet title to realty acquired by 
tax deed. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs 
and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court held that 
the Statute of Limitations respecting actions to recover 
property acquired by tax deed was constitutional, and 
defendants' defense was barred by such Statute. This 
was and is a clear holding that Statutes of limitation 
in Utah apply to defenses as well as claims. 
As to whether the Statute of Limitations has i*un 
factually, counsel again resorts to a bland kind of in-
difference to the testimony of his own client. He states 
at page 36: 
"A second weakness in the Statute of Limi-
tations argument arises from the fact that the 
fianst time the fraud or mistake in this case was 
brought to the attention of the defendant was 
when the Complaint was filed/' 
Mrs. Pace, however, testified that, "I was aware 
that it should have been in there before I ever signed 
it." How long will counsel for defendant persist with 
his refusal to accept tine foregoing testimony as fact in 
this case? We suppose he just hopes it will go away. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant was fully aware on September 8, 1965, 
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when she and plaintiffs signed the Lease-Sales Agree-
ment that said document contained no reservation of 
sub-surface rights, and she made no effort to reform the 
instrument. Defendant was fully aware on May 22, 1967, 
when the Lease-Extension Agreement was signed that 
the original agreement contained no reservation of sub-
surface rights, and she made no effort to reform the in-
strument. Defendant was fully aware on January 8,1971, 
when she accepted the three checks and the option was 
exercised that the original agreement and the Lease Ex-
tension Agreement contained no reservation of sub-sur-
face rights, and she made no effort to reform the instru-
ment. But during the two and a half months that fol-
lowed, an unrest took place in her mind. She saw a law-
yer and for the first time the concept of an Escrow 
Agreement erected its head. In May of 1971, a proposed 
Escrow Agreement was sent to plaintiff containing 
changes in the original agreement and for the first time 
incorporating a reservation of sub-surface rights. Plain-
tiff refused to sign. On June 2, 1971, the defendant 
returned the $2,000.00 and repudiated the exercise of the 
option. Plaintiff attempted to negotiate the dispute and 
failed, stating in a letter on June 15, 1971, (Exhibit 10), 
"It is only our intention to purchase the farm as per 
our original agreement and the terms there outlined." 
Within the option period, plaintiff filed a lawsuit 
asking for specific performance and declaratory relief 
and for an opportunity to exercise the option. Defen-
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dant refused. The oil and gas rights had become valu-
able. Defense counsel alleged fraud. They failed in their 
proof. They alleged mutual mistake and failed in their 
proof. They then accused plaintiffs' counsel of "obfusca-
tion" and asked for "justice." We are reminded of the 
language in Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western Mining 
Company, a Utah case, 80 P. 2d 338, where it is said: 
"In this class of cases more than ordinary 
diligence is exacted in seeking to enforce hidden 
equities and bringing them to the light of day. 
A mine of little value today may b y develop-
ments or a sudden discovery of rich'ore be of 
great, even fabulous, values tomorrow or next 
year. The concealed claimant may not then 
suddenly spring from his ambuscade of silence, 
and exact a division." 
It is our position that if the trial court's ruling in 
this case is allowed to stand, it will cast suspicion and 
doubt upon every sale of a motel, a ranch, a turkey fanm, 
a home, or any other piece of real property in the State 
of Utah. Parties, after years have elapsed, observing 
changes in the values of sub-surface rights, will be al-
lowed to contest established written contractual rights 
with claims of oral agreements to reserve sub-surface 
rights. And the funadmental common-law policy of 
maintaining stability of titles in the field of property 
law will have been defeated. 
We respectfully take the position that the trial court's 
decision in this case should be reversed and plaintiffs 
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should be allowed to exercise their option and to purchase 
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